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POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE, CAUSALITY AND SUPPLY RESPONSE
IN WORLD MARKETS: THE CASE OF U.S. AND
AUSTRALIAN TOBACCO
ABSTRACT
The economic impact of international policy interdependence is illustrated
using the world tobacco market as an example.
assessed using U.S. and Australian data.

The price discovery process is

It appears that world tobacco prices

are set through an oligopolistic rule-of-thumb pricing system with the U.S.
being the tacit price leader.

As a result, there has been a causal relation-

ship between U.S . and Australian tobacco prices .

However, no direct supply

response to U.S. prices was observed in Australian markets .

POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE, CAUSALITY AND SUPPLY RESPONSE
IN WORLD MARKETS: THE CASE OF U.S. AND
AUSTRALIAN TOBACCO
Agricultural trade is increasingly influenced by international policy
interdependence (Sarris and Schmitz).
process is affected.

As a result, the world price discovery

For example, there is evidence of international policy

interdependence such that U.S. tobacco prices influence the world price trend
(Hicks, Blank and Davis).

These points are significant because to the extent

that the U.S. plays a major role in world tobacco price formation, it may indirectly influence policy decisions in other countries concerning prices and
levels of assistance and, as a result, may influence the supply response of
the world industry.
Although the choice of price levels is made by market forces in some
countries, in many countries it is made by conscious administration, such as
in the U.S. and Australia.

The choice concerning administered price levels

influences the levels of protection and assistance offered to domestic tobacco
industries.

When that choice is made by small importing nations such as

Australia, international market implications (if any) may not be considered
directly (Industries Assistance Connnission).

When domestic price levels are

determined by large exporting nations, such as the U.S., international market
reactions must be considered because those responses can be significant.
Objective of the Study
To understand the economic impact of international policy interdependence
it is necessary to understand the world market.

Therefore, the objective of

this paper is to evaluate the role played by the U.S. in the world tobacco
market by analyzing the price discovery process in that market.
the following questions will be considered:

In doing so,

(1) does the U.S. government,
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through its policies, influence world prices?, (2) if so, how does the U. S .
influence world prices?, and (3) is there an international supply response
to U.S. prices?
In this paper Australia is presented as an example of how pricing choices
are made on international markets.

Australia is a useful case study because

its government has recently addressed the issues involved in reducing the level
of assistance to its tobacco industry through adjustments in price levels.

In

that process they gave much consideration to their largest source of imported
tobacco -- the U.S.
World Market and Prices
Before the issue of U.S. impacts on world prices can be discussed it is
necessary to first identify a representative "world" price and to define the
world market from which that price comes.

Flue-cured tobacco represents

approximately half of total world production and over 40 percent of total
world exports so it will be the product form used in the analysis.
The method used here to define a "world market" specifies countries as
"firms" within a world-wide "industry."

The world price defined here is a

weighted average of f.o.b. export prices of major trading nations, which is
only an indicator of "world" prices.

Export f.o.b. prices are used because

they are more likely to represent "free market" levels than would governmentsupported domestic prices.
To determine which countries are to be included in the weighted average
to arrive at the world price, it is necessary to calculate the proportion of
total world exports that have been contributed by each country.

These nations

are identified by considering export volumes over the three-year period 1979-81,
rather than total production volumes, so as to specify their true impact on
the world market.

Using the standard approach of evaluating market concentration

ratios leads to choosing the largest 4, 8 or 20 firms (exporting nations),
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whichever number results in a ratio high enough to be considered representative
of the entire market (Caves).

In this study the 8 largest countries were used

because a majority of the market was represented (Table 1).

The prices from

each of those countries are weighted according to their relative proportion
of the total export quantities for the eight nations used to get the world
price indicator.

Due to the fact that the U.S. is the largest exported, two

world prices were calculated.

Countries 1-8 in Table 1 are the largest ex-

porters (representing 85% of trade) and would normally be used in calculating
the weighted average world price.

However, to allow analysis of the relation-

ship between U.S. and international prices, a second weighted average price
was calculated using countries 2-9 (representing 58% of world exports).
The Influence of U.S. Prices
There has been a strong relationship between U.S. and world tobacco prices
in the past.

U.S. export prices are highly correlated (r

world price series described above.

=

.99) with both the

U.S. export prices are also correlated

with the f.o.b. export prices of the eight other exporters listed in Table 1
(r > 0.6 in all cases).

Yet, the existence of such a relationship implies

nothing about the influence (if any) of one market participant (the U.S.) over
other participants.
To explain the observed pricing behavior, it is necessary to consider the
market structure.

For the most part, the world tobacco market is made up of

producer marketing boards, national trading agencies and a few large multinational firms.

Sarris and Schmitz argue that under this market structure

it may be more appropriate to use oligopoly theory, rather than the traditional
competitive model, to analyze pricing in international markets.

This position

is supported by the fact that the world flue-cured tobacco industry, as
defined here, fits the description of a "homogeneous oligopoly" provided by

TABLE 1.

WORLD EXPORTS OF FLUE-CURED TOBACCO, 1979-81
Percent of World Exports

1.

U.S.A.

28.2

2.

Brazil

15.3

3.

Zimbabwe

15.1

4.

India

11.6

5.

Thailand

4.5

6.

Canada

4.4

7.

Malawi

3 .3

8.

Korea, Rep.

2.7

9.

Philippines

1.5

Sour ce:

U.S.D.A.
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· Breimyer (p. 66-67).

Breimyer says that firms in such an industry are highly

sensitive to price competition and "price leadership or tacit collusion is
highly likely" (p. 6 7) •
A common oligopolistic pricing system is that of price leadership by the
dominant firm.

The price correlations described above are consistent with

both competition and price leadership; therefore, it is possible that the U.S.
may be performing the role of price leader for the world flue-cured tobacco
market.

Two factors give the U.S. market power:

(1) it consumes about 14

percent of all unmanufactured tobacco and is the largest exporter and importer
of flue-cured tobacco; and (2) the structure and size of its information
collection and

dissemination . sys~em

is unmatched by other market participants.

Yet, Sarris and Schmitz question whether standard industrial organization
pricing models, such as price leadership, are realistic when governments, rather
than firms, set prices.
An alternative explanation for the observed price relationships may be
provided by the model of rule-of-thumb pricing.

Rule-of-thumb pricing is an

example of a method that can lead to monopolistic price formation through
tacit co-ordination of independent actions of the market participants (Sarris
and Schmitz).

A typical rule-of-thumb pricing method is that of "full costing,"

as described by Breimyer (p. 53-62).

Full costing is often used by governments

when establishing minimum prices (IAC).

Other rule-of-thumb methods involve

setting prices according to specific economic variables such as inflation
rates or product quality.

In the case of tobacco, consumers have considered

U.S. leaf to be of superior quality; thus, the observed prices reflect
quality differences (Johnson; Reed and Schnepf).
When developing a new formula for administering domestic prices the
Australian government decided to use the apparent price leader (the U.S.) as
the base, rather than prices from smaller trading nations.

The formula

specifically requires that Australian prices be set at a predetermined leyel
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expressed in terms of its relationship to U.S. prices (such as 70% of the
export value of U.S. flue-cured tobacco) (Blank).

Clearly, this is a case

of rule-of-thumb pricing which creates policy interdependence.
The discussion above implies that a causal relationship may exist between
U.S. and Australia (and other countries') tobacco prices if the smaller
trading nation follows U.S. price movements by using some rule-of-thumb pricing
method.

This question raises a second issue:

if other countries set their

tobacco prices in accord with U.S. price movements, is there a resulting foreign
supply response to U.S. price changes?

Both of these issues are evaluated

below for the case of Australia.
Causal Relationship Between Prices
The new formula for setting Australian domestic tobacco pri ces assures that
a causal relationship will exist in the future between U. S . and Australian
prices.

To determine whether U.S. price movements have inf l uenced Australian

price movements in the past, a causality test suggested by Granger and refined
by Geweke is applied to annual data from 1960-82.
The test, as outlined by Bessler and Brandt, directly utilizes ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression on levels of the time series .

To test causality

running from U.S. f.o.b . export prices (X) to Australian domestic prices (Y)
of flue-cured tobacco at time t, the following specification is used:

where p and q are the number of lags (j and k) used to eliminate autocorre l ation,
e 1 t and e 2 t are white noise residuals, a 1 j and a 2j are parameters relating Yt
and its lagged values, and b 2k are parameters relating Yt and past values
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(from time t-k) of X.

The sum of squared errors from OLS regressions on (1)

and (2) are used to calculate the well-known statistic, F*, which tests the
hypothesis that X causes Y (Pierce and Haugh).
Bessler and Brandt also present a test of no instantaneous causality which
is based on the residuals from equation (2) and those from

Results of the tests for one-way causality between U.S. export prices and
Australian domestic prices of flue-cured tobacco are
U.S. +Aust

F*

Aust+ U.S.

F*

25.38 (significant at the 99% level)
1.10 (insignificant at the 95% level).

The equations were estimated using only one lagged value because all lags of
more than one year proved to have an insignificant effect on Yt.

The two F*

statistics above indicate that there is strong one-way causality from U.S. to
Australian prices while there is no significant one-way causality running
from Australian to U.S. prices.

In addition, the result F*

=

0.03 (insignificant

at the 95% level) for the test of no instantaneous causality strengthens the
conclusion that Australian tobacco prices are significantly influenced by
U.S. prices which, in turn, are determined without any influence from
Australian markets.
Foreign Supply Response
The fact that Australian prices are influenced by U.S. prices and that
the two price series have been highly correlated (r

=

.90) leads to the

expectation that there will be an Australian supply response to U.S. tobacco
price changes.

Even though Australian producers may evaluate only Australian

prices when making their production decisions, the new price setting formula
means that indirectly those producers will be responding to U.S. price signals
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in the future.

In the past the Australian price was not tied directly to

the U.S. price so other variables may have been more significant in determining
supply response.
The new Australian price setting formula creates a systematic relationship
between U.S. export prices and Australian domestic prices whereas the relationship has been somewhat spurious in the past.

The new arrangements have trans-

formed the role of the Australian government into one of simply transmitting
U.S. export prices to the Australian market after making an adjustment (which
is known in advance).

Due to the fact that the U.S. announces its planned

price levels in advance and that there is a six-month difference between the
seasons in the two countries, Australian producers will be responding to U.S.
prices.

In the past the Australian government played a much more important

role in setting prices .

Even though there was a causal relationship between

U.S. and Australian prices, the Australian government set specific domestic
price levels after considering additional variables such as cost of production
(BAE, p. 90).

This means that the relationship between the two price series

was spurious in that U.S. prices influenced the Australian government which,
in turn, set Australian domestic prices.
Several types of government intervention influence Australian tobacco
markets, thus altering the supply response process.

For example, all sales

of Australian tobacco are made under an official grade and minimum price
schedule drawn up annually by the Australian Tobacco Board.

Also, the Common-

wealth government is continuing a scheme under which manufacturers must use
a certain minimum percentage of Australian leaf in order to qualify for a
concessional rate of duty on imported tobacco (BAE, p. 90-1).

Therefore,

tobacco supply response will not be typical of responses from competitive
markets (Pandey, Piggott and MacAulay).
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To test whether there has been an Australian supply response to changes
in the U.S. export prices a linear model was formulated as follows:
(4)

Qt= a+ b 0 Pt + b 1 Pt-l + ·•• + bnPt-n - c 1PPt + c 2 t + Ut

where tis time, a linear trend where t 1

1970, ..• , t 13 = 1982; Qt is total

Australian acreage (1,000 ha) planted to tobacco at time t; Pt is the U.S.
export price index deflated by the Australian producer price received index;
PPt is the Australian producer prices paid index; a, b's, and e's are parameters
to be estimated and Ut is an error term in time t.

The model, similar to that

used by Levins, was estimated directly using OLS regressions of annual data
from 1970 to 1982 incorporating only one lagged price variable (Pt-l) because
it was expected that resources could be shifted in or out of tobacco production
from one year to the next.

Also, Qt was specified as acreage total rather

than production total to better reflect producer decisions without the added
variance which the yield per hectare factor gives to total production figures.
It is believed that estimation results for equation (4) will provide some
insight into the nature of the pricing process being used by Australia (in
the past) as well as providing a base for describing the supply response to
that pricing process.

Implicit in the specification of (4) are hypotheses

concerning relationships between supply (Qt) and both U.S. export prices (Pt)
and Australian input prices (PPt).

If Pt proves to be a significant influence

on Qt while PPt is insignificant, the implication is that price leadership
may be the prevalent pricing influence in the Australian market.

On the

other hand, if PPt is significant and Pt is not, rule-of-thumb pricing is
implied since the variable PPt is a proxy for government actions (the government used "cost of production" as its primary justification for setting prices
in the past -- BAE, pp. 90-1).

However, if both Pt and PPt are significant

influences on Qt, both market price leadership and rule-of-thumb processes
may be operating, but there would be no evidence as to which was dominant.
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Upon estimation the first specification of the model had two insignificant
variables so a second specification was estimated with those variables omitted,
yielding the following:
(5)

Qt = 10.2

+

(5.96)
-2
where R

=

.92, DW

for the variables.

.574Pt

.045PPt

(0.98)

(8.57)

=

2.27, and the numbers in parentheses are the t-test values

The two remaining variables each have the expected signs,

but the U.S. price variable is not significant.
The results above indicate (1) there was not an Australian supply response
to U.S. export prices, and (2) government-induced rule-of-thumb pricing
methods appeared to be dominant in the Australian tobacco market.

Therefore ,

it is expected that in each country where the government plays a significant
role in the price setting process using some type of rule-of-thumb , there
will not be a direct supply response to U.S. prices, even though prices
will generally follow the trend set by the U. S.
Concluding Remarks
It appears that the U.S . may be performing the function of a price leader
in an oligopolistic world flue-cured tobacco industry.

The eight largest

tobacco exporting nations (including the U.S.) represent 85 percent of world
tobacco exports at this time, implying the existence of an oligopoly.

In an

oligopoly it is expected that small firms (trading nations) will follow the
price trend set by a price leader.

Such interdependent behavior is evident

in the "world" tobacco industry, although the U.S. may not have purposely
taken the leadership role.

It is likely that other nations (such as

Australia) simply chose to follow the largest trader, the U.S., by adopting
policies involving a rule-of-thumb method of pricing.
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A major implication of such market behavior is that change in U.S.
tobacco prices may cause an indirect international supply response as other
nations adjust their prices accordingly.

However, the extent of any response

depends on how choices concerning domestic market prices and quantities are
made in other countries - through market competition or public administration.
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